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ANTITRUST ENCROACHMENT ON PATENT IMPERATIVES
ARTHUR R. WHALE*
INTRODUCTION
THERE IS MOUNTING EVIDENCE of inconsistency and confusion in the
courts and a disturbing trend in the Department of Justice concerning
the terms that may be incorporated in patent licenses without invoking
the sanctions of the antitrust laws. The importance of this development
lies in the fact that in licensing patents, the freedom to adapt the license
to the business situation facing the patent owner and his prospective
licensee is often indispensable to the full utilization of the patent for
the benefit of both the public and the patent owner.
It is the purpose of this article to examine certain of the specific
provisions often found in licensing agreements which are under actual
or threatened attack. These provisions are:
1. Field-of-use provisions;
2. The right to license or not to license;
3. The freely negotiated royalty;
4. Royalty differential between nonexclusive licensees;
5. The royalty base;
6. Royalty for the package license; and
7. Royalty payment after expiration of the patent.
The first two provisions are considered "absolute imperatives."
Their importance is viewed as sufficient to justify statutory declara-
tion of legality. The remaining five provisions are considered "pro-
visional imperatives." They are likewise important and should at least
be regarded as presumptively legal, subject to a demonstration of un-
reasonableness. The author believes it is necessary to foreclose (1)
judicial declaration that such provisions are per se illegal and (2)
effective intimidation to the same effect by the Department of Justice.
* Manager, Organic Chemicals Section, Patent Department, The Dow Chemical Com-
pany.
The author desires to express special gratitude to Tom Arnold, Theodore L. Bowes,
Bill Durkee and Frank L. Neuhauser for their comments on various aspects of this subject,
although it cannot be said that any of them, or The Dow Chemical Company subscribe to
all of the views expressed herein.
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This necessity will be shown by considering the function of patents
in the innovative process and the practical problems of the patent owner
in utilizing his patent through licensing.
THE ROLE OF PATENTS IN INNOVATION
There are two distinct and important roles of patents in the innova-
tive process, one widely recognized and the other too often ignored. Both
are embraced within the constitutional requirement that the patent system
"promote the progress of ... useful arts."'
The first role is to provide an incentive to invent, or more com-
monly, to support inventive efforts. Of course, a few gifted individuals
invent as a reflexive response to a problem or challenge. They may have
little regard for the economics or marketability of their inventions but
simply invent to exercise their creative talents. For them, the patent
system may provide little personal incentive to invent (although patents
may afford the only means for bringing their inventions into use for the
benefit of the public).
But the ofttimes risky investment in research, development, design,
manufacturing and marketing activities could hardly be justified if the
results could always be freely copied by those having no such costs to
recover. The innovator of a marketable product needs a lead time dur-
ing which he can deny competitors a free and profitable ride on his
investment. This is what the patent system gives in exchange for disclo-
sure of the invention in a patent-provided the invention can qualify as
sufficiently different from what has been done before to merit a patent.
Given this limited lead time, which in the United States is seven-
teen years, the patent owner has an opportunity to recover his expenses,
earn a profit and possibly invest in other innovative ventures, so long
as the public is satisfied his product is worth the price. It is the prospect
of patent coverage that justifies much of the investment in research and
development leading to new products, new plants, new employment op-
portunities and genuine progress in the "useful arts."
The second role of patents in innovation is to aid in securing or
1 The Congress shall have power . . . To promote the progress of science and
useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive
right to their respective writings and discoveries.
US. Const. art. I, § 8.
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supplementing the ability to market. At the patent's expiration, anyone
can use the invention free of the patent. In the meantime, public disclo-
sure of the invention in the patent often stimulates others to invent im-
provements or make quite different inventions, building on the ideas in
the patent.
While public disclosure of the invention in the patent is therefore
a contribution in itself, the full range of benefits contemplated by the
patent system is not realized until the patented invention is embodied
in a product or service available to the public. The right to exclude others
from using an invention is hollow indeed, both from the standpoint of
the patent owner and the public, if the patent owner lacks the money,
talent, organization or facilities to bring the invention to the market. It
is therefore essential that if the patent owner decides to market the in-
vention he be able to license his patent to secure what he lacks in the
means to market through the vehicle of license agreements.
This is particularly important where the invention is capable of
application outside the inventor's regular field of interest or competence.
In such event, he needs to use his patent in a business arrangement that
will give incentive to those of his choosing who are expert in other fields
and can handle the special problems of development, manufacturing
and marketing.
These two elements, the incentive to invent (or to support inventive
efforts) and the ability to market, are the heart of a patent's contribution
to innovation. They are sequential but inseparable, and recognition of
this duality is important in resolving patent-antitrust conflicts in the area
of patent licensing.
Too often, however, the patent-antitrust conflicts are resolved solely
by examining whether striking down the patent owner's licensing arrange-
ments would impair the incentive to invent. Professor Donald F. Turner,
former Assistant Attorney General, has fallen victim to this all-too-nar-
row approach when he assesses the impact of the antitrust laws on the
patent system and concludes that "antitrust does not retard technological
progress."2 This approach measures the impact of antitrust enforcement
on the patent system by its effect on only one of the two essential ingredi-
ents of innovation.
2 Turner, Patents, Antitrust and Innovation, 28 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 151 (1966). See also
Kadish, Patents and Antitrust: Guides and Caveats, 13 Idea 83 (1969).
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Certainly, there could be an extreme reached in antitrust enforce-
ment which would all but destroy any incentive to invent. But before
that point, the innovation fostered by the patent system could be severely
impaired by unduly limiting the right of the patent owner to secure the
ability to market his invention through licensing his patent.
THE CONTRIBUTION OF PATENTS TO THE ANTITRUST OBJECTIVE
To the extent the patent owner has the exclusive right to prevent
others from making, using and selling the invention, he does, indeed,
enjoy a "monopoly," albeit a temporary one. But the temporary monop-
oly of the patent takes nothing from the public, for the patent by law
covers only that created for the first time by the inventor. In some
quarters, the monopoly of the patent has given rise to the erroneous idea
that patent and antitrust concepts are endlessly opposed and that in
patent-antitrust confrontations the patent must always yield.
In truth, however, the utilization of the temporary patent monopoly
brings an entirely new dimension to the free competition sought by the
antitrust laws. This new dimension arises from the necessity for compet-
itors to discover their own routes to successful products, a process which
in its implementation brings new and better products to the market. In-
deed, there is no stronger incentive to invent, or to invest in inventive
efforts, than a successful, patented product in the hands of a competitor.
This may properly be called "innovative competition" or "competition
in value," as distinguished from "price competition" which is not secured
through application of any of the antitrust laws.
PATENTS, PROFITS, AND PROPHETS
If the support of inventive efforts leads to the grant of a patent, or
if a patent is otherwise acquired, the problem of the patent owner is how
to use the patent for profit. The patent may cover a manufactured arti-
cle, a device or machine, a chemical compound or combination of com-
pounds, a process for making something, or a method for doing
something. If practicable, the patent owner usually chooses to make and
sell the patented product himself or to use the process in his own plant.
However, if in his business judgment he decides that the best oppor-
tunity for profitable use of the invention lies in granting licenses to
others, he must proceed with the utmost caution. First, he must choose
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as his licensees only those who, by their good reputations or capabilities,
will bring credit to his invention. In licensing his patent, he is parting
with a portion of the exclusive privilege his patent gives him, and li-
censed activities that would demean the invention would inevitably
lessen the value of his remaining rights under the patent.
Second, he must fashion the patent license to the business situation
in which he finds himself. Obviously, the arrangement must hold pros-
pects of profit for both parties. A patent is not like a commodity that can
be priced and placed on the shelf for sale. In "merchandising" or licens-
ing a patent, many factors must be considered, some arising from the
interests of the patent owner and others from the interests of the poten-
tial licensee. By a process of negotiation, each party represents its in-
terests and strengths in seeking to arrive at an arrangement satisfactory
to both which is within legal bounds and will remain so for the life of
the agreement.
Among the factors considered, many of which give rise to some
form of expression in the licensing agreement, are the following:
Cost of development to the patent owner and licensee;
Anticipated volume of sales;
Patent owner's product line and market position;
Need for exclusivity;
Territory of sales or use;
Availability of substitutes not under patent;
Number of patents involved;
Scope of invention versus scope of patent coverage;
Ease of circumventing patent;
Need for licenses under patents of others;
Relative value of invention in different fields of use;
Capability of licensee to serve all fields of use;
Need for lead time;
Need for further technical development;
Need for market development;
Need for investment in production facilities;
Financial responsibility of licensee;
Expected savings from use of invention;
Need for technical assistance from patent owner;
Need for use of trade secrets;
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Availability to licensee of later improvements by patent owner;
Fair royalty;
Base for royalty determination;
Protection against later licenses at lower royalties;
Exchange of licenses in lieu of royalty;
Availability to patent owner of later improvements by licensee;
Right to grant sublicenses;
Detectability of infringement;
Willingness of patent owner to enforce patent against unlicensed
infringers;
Willingness of patent owner to defend licensee against infringe-
ment suits brought by others; and
Conditions for terminating the license.
In taking these and other factors into account, the patent owner can
properly include in the license only those provisions reasonably related
to securing the legitimate benefits of the patent grant (the right to ex-
clude others from making, using or selling the patented invention). If
the license goes further, the legality of the arrangement can properly be
called into question because the patent has been employed beyond its
lawful scope. In the latter instance, the patent owner is said to have
"misused" his patent.'
Patent misuse is a defense against a charge of infringement and
may relieve the infringer of liability. Although the patent may be valid,
the patent owner loses his right to enforce it so long as the misuse con-
tinues and the consequences have not been corrected. If the misuse can
be shown to have adversely affected competition, or to have been part of
a plan to restrain or monopolize trade, the acts of misuse may rise to a
violation of the antitrust laws.4
3 Motion Pictures Patent Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917). See
also Morton Salt Co. v. Suppiger, 314 U.S. 488 (1942) for an elaboration of this theory.
4 The phrase "antitrust laws" refers to Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, which
provide that contracts, combinations or conspiracies in restraint of interstate or foreign
trade or commerce are illegal (§ 1) and that persons who monopolize, or attempt to
monopolize, or conspire to monopolize any part of interstate or foreign trade or commerce
are guilty of a misdemeanor and are subject to criminal sanctions (§ 2), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2;
Sections 3 and 7 of the Clayton Act which provide that it is unlawful to sell or lease com-
modities, whether patented or unpatented, on condition that the purchaser or lessee will
not deal in the products of the seller's or lessor's competitors where the effect may be to
substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly (§ 3) and that no corporation
can acquire the stock or assets (generally interpreted as including patents and interests
in patents) of another corporation where the effect may be to substantially lessen competi.
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While patent misuse is effective only as a defense to a suit for in-
fringement or a related suit for breach of a license, activities believed
to constitute antitrust violations may be enjoined by a court at the re-
quest of the Department of Justice, acting in the name of the United
States Government, or on the basis of an action brought by injured
private parties. The penalties for antitrust violations can range from
heavy fines to prison sentences, and injured private parties can sue for
treble damages.
In view of recent interpretations of the antitrust laws, the patent
owner who licenses his patent needs the gift of prophecy. For in tailor-
ing his license to the business situation existing at the time of licensing,
he and his prospective licensee must forsee not only how the courts and
the Department of Justice might interpret the license provisions, but
also how changing business circumstances might affect such interpreta-
tions.
THE DILEMMA OF UNCERTAINTY
As will be demonstrated below, the state of the case law on patent
license provisions is unsettled in the extreme. But of equal importance
is the uncertainty created by the posture of the Department of Justice.
The establishment of a Patent Unit within the Antitrust Division of the
Department of Justice underscores the concern on the part of patent
owners as well as licensees over some of the policies that seem to be
emerging in the patent-antitrust area.
Speaking in Washington D. C. on June 5, 1969, Assistant Attorney
General McLaren, who is in charge of the Antitrust Division of the
Department of Justice, outlined the guiding philosophy of antitrust
enforcement:
In considering whether to attack a particular licensing provision or
practice, we ask ourselves two fundamental questions. First, is the
particular provision justifiable as necessary to the patentee's exploita-
tion of his lawful monopoly? Second, are less restrictive alternatives
available to the patentee? Where the answer to the first question is no,
tion or tend to create a monopoly (§ 7), 15 U.S.C. §§ 14, 18; and Section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act which provides that the Federal Trade Commission can issue cease
and desist orders against unfair methods of competition and against violations of Sections 3
and 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41 et seq. To date, the Federal Trade Commission
has taken little action in matters involving patents.
5 THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, Jan. 7, 1970 at 16, col. 1 (midwest ed.).
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and to the second yes, we will consider bringing a case challenging the
restriction involved. (Emphasis added) 6
The Department of Justice is therefore not only concerned with whether
a given practice in a given situation in fact constitutes an antitrust viola-
tion, but also with whether the particular licensing arrangement was
"necessary" or whether there might have been other ways of using the
patent that would have imposed less "restriction" on the licensee.
If the patent owner can deny access of all others to his invention,
it would seem appropriate that he be entitled to control the degree to
which he relinquishes his exclusive rights, so long as the license pro-
visions are within or reasonably ancillary to the patent grant. Never-
theless, the patent owner would be called on to anticipate the outcome of
a test of a licensing arrangement, made in a given business context at a
specific point in time, against the subjective criteria of "necessity" and
"availability of alternatives" applied at some future time.
LEGISLATIVE RECOGNITION OF PATENT IMPERATIVES
The present patent statute, 35 U. S. C. § I et seq., does not address
itself specifically to any of the patent licensing problems of concern
here beyond the general declaration in Section 261 that "patents shall
have the attributes of personal property." Perhaps the first unbiased
recognition of a need for legislation in this area came, surprisingly,
from the President's Commission on the Patent System. This Commis-
sion, appointed by President Johnson in 1965, reported its findings in
1966.' Its report was not regarded by the patent bar as being particu-
larly solicitous of some aspects of the patent system, but the Commis-
sion went out of its way to deal with the relationship between the patent
system and the antitrust laws. In Recommendation 22 the Commission
urged:
The licensable nature of the rights granted by a patent should be
clarified by specifically stating in the patent statute that: (1) applica-
tions for patents, patents, or any interests therein may be licensed in the
whole, or in any specified part of, the field of use to which the subject
matter of the claims of the patent are directly applicable, and (2) a
patent owner shall not be deemed guilty of patent misuse merely because
6 Address by Assistant Attorney General Richard W. McLaren to The Patent Trade-
mark and Copyright Research Institute of the George Washington University, June 5, 1969
as published in 161 U.S.P.Q.
7 Report of the President's Commission on the Patent System, U.S. Government Print-
ing Office (1966).
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he agreed to a contractual provision or imposed a condition on a
licensee, which has (a) a direct relation to the disclosure and claims
of the patent, and (b) the performance of which is reasonable under
the circumstances to secure to the patent owner the full benefit of his
invention and patent grant. This recommendation is intended to make
clear that the "rule of reason" shall constitute the guideline for de-
termining patent misuse.
Senate Bill 1042, the so-called "Patent Reform Act," was intro-
duced in 1967 to implement generally the Commission's recommenda-
tions, but it failed to include provisions embodied in Recommendation
22. Although Senator Long (Democrat, Missouri) subsequently intro-
duced amendments to Senate Bill 1042 covering field-of-use licenses
and adopting a rule of reason approach to determining patent misuse,8
later bills omitted substantial reference to this area. The reasons were
two-fold: first, the patent bar became absorbed in the patent provisions
of the various bills and failed to give adequate attention to antitrust
questions or to take advantage of the opportunity afforded by the Com-
mission's Recommendation 22, even though the Commission's Report was
the basis or stimulus for all the bills that followed. Note, for example,
the remarks of Senator McClellan (Democrat, Arkansas) accompanying
the introduction of Senate Bill 3892 in 1968:
The bill does not contain any special provisions relating to the licensing
of patent rights, field of use restrictions, and the doctrine of patent
misuse, such as were recommended by the President's Commission.
Although I believe that the recommendations of the Commission are
generally meritorious, there was little direct testimony during the hear-
ings on the patent-antitrust relationship. (Emphasis added).9
Second, during this period the Department of Justice was effectively
discouraging any legislation sounding like Recommendation 22. Note,
for example, Senator McClellan's remarks accompanying his introduc-
tion of another patent bill, Senate Bill 1246, in 1969:
This bill does not contain any special provisions relating to the licensing
of patent rights, field-of-use restrictions, and the doctrine of patent
misuse, such as were proposed by the President's Commission. Al-
though I believe the recommendations of the Commission in this area
were generally meritorious, the Department of Justice during the sub-
committee hearings strongly opposed the inclusion of such provisions
in the patent revision bill. (Emphasis added).10
Again, Senator McClellan had this to say later in 1969 as he introduced
Senate Bill 2756, the patent bill now pending before the Congress:
8 These amendments were introduced May 3, 1967.
9 90 Cong. Rec. 9444 (daily ed. July 26, 1968).
10 91 Cong. Rec. 2113 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1969).
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I have felt that the relationship between the patent and antitrust laws
deserved careful consideration and with the change in administration
I wrote to the Attorney General on February 28 [1969] asking for the
current views of the Department of Justice. I received on June 10
[1969] a letter from Richard W. McLaren, Assistant Attorney General,
Antitrust Division, stating, "I strongly urge the committee not to
incorporate Proposal No. 22 in any proposed patent legislation." Mr.
McLaren indicated that any necessary development or clarification of
the law in this area could be obtained as part of the Department's
antitrust enforcement program. (Emphasis added).11
There matters stood in the Congress until April 7, 1970. On that
date Senator Scott (Republican, Pennsylvania) introduced amendments
to sections 261 and 27112 of the latest bill, Senate Bill 2756, which
would, in essence, change the present statutory provisions in several
important respects:
(1) New Section 261 would specifically legitimize the field-of-use
license as a simple extension of the concept underlying the terri-
torial license;
(2) Section 271 would extend the exemptions from misuse to
those licensing arrangements which exclude conduct otherwise
actionable as infringement or conduct that is reasonable under the
circumstances to gain for the patent owner the full benefit of his
patent grant; and
(3) Section 271 would provide for exemptions from misuse of
certain specified practices concerning royalty, fee or purchase
price.
The actual scope of new Section 271 is unclear, and it would ap-
pear that clarification is in order. Section 261, however, is unambiguous
and, as will be noted below, is directed to much needed changes in the
patent statute.
The final contribution by Senator Scott in his trio of amendments
would modify Section 301 of Senate Bill 2756. This amendment is
directed at the dire prospect that licensing of trade secrets and propri-
etary information would be precluded on the theory that the federal
patent laws pre-empt the enforcement of private contracts purporting to
license inventions not patented or patentable. The prospect arises from
11 91 Cong. Rec. 8952 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1969).
12 91 Cong. Rec. 5321 (daily ed. April 8, 1970).
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recent court decisions," so the problem is here and now. It is submitted
that Senator Scott's Section 301 deals effectively with this serious devel-
opment and merits strong support, although substantive discussion of the
question is beyond the scope of this paper.
THE IMPERATIVES
Before examining individually certain specific licensing problems
and imperatives, it will serve the better understanding of the patent
owner's dilemma to consider how easily, in the exercise of sound busi-
ness judgment, he can fall victim to a whole conglomeration of anti-
trust problems in licensing his patent. Here is the plight, ficticious but
representative, of Company A:
Company A is a small manufacturer of electrical switches based in
Los Angeles. Its sales are confined to switches for use in buildings in
the Los Angeles area. The company owns a patent on a switch which
was developed at a cost of $70,000 and three years' effort. It believes
the switch can be adapted for other uses but considers expansion
undesirable because of lack of capital, development personnel and
manufacturing capacity, as well as the increased costs of marketing
in remote areas. It does, however, want to retain the exclusive right
to the switch in the building field in the Los Angeles area.
In order to reach other markets, Company A decides to license the
patent at a royalty of 5%, giving each licensee the exclusive territory
he demands in which to sell and service switches, and limiting each
to the sale of switches for use in buildings.
The manufacturer in the Detroit area would like to develop the
patented switch concept for use in automobiles. However, in order to
recover the estimated $100,000 required for the development, he asks
for an exclusive license in the automotive field. A royalty of 2% is
established as reasonable in view of the development costs and the low
profit margin from large volume sales to automobile manufacturers.
Back in Los Angeles, a competitor of Company A, who manufac-
tures switches for use in aircraft as well as buildings, asks for a non-
exclusive license for the building field and an exclusive license for the
aircraft industry. The license for the building trade is refused, because
the company wants to retain the exclusive right in its home territory.
But the exclusive license for the aircraft field is granted at a 10%
royalty rate. This figure contemplates the high profit margin but low
sales volume of switches for the aircraft industry.
At this point the company consults its attorney to prepare the
various agreements. The attorney is convinced that the business judg-
ment is sound, all terms are reasonable, and the arrangements will move
Is Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969); Painton & Company, Ltd. v. Bourns, Inc.,
164 U.S.P.Q. 595 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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the invention to markets throughout the United States at the earliest
possible time, with responsible financial backing and business skill in
each of the markets served. But the attorney nevertheless advises that
(1) it has jeopardized the enforceability of the patent in all markets,
including its own market in Los Angeles, by refusing to license its Los
Angeles competitor in the building field after licensing others elsewhere
in the same field; 14 (2) it has invited an antitrust suit, because the
Justice Department has declared it is looking for a situation where a
patent license divides fields of use among companies that would other-
wise compete; 15 (3) it has opened itself to private antitrust and treble
damage claims from its competitors as well as those of its licensees;16
and (4) it has provided ingredients of a defense of patent misuse by
charging different royalty rates under the same patent.1"
This example illustrates several patent imperatives. Company A is
small and incapable of extending its market outside its home area. But
the magnitude of the invention's contribution is not diminished because
of the patent owner's size. Therefore, if Company A is denied the right
to license individually the various fields of use of the invention, and on
terms that will encourage the licensees to proceed with manufacturing
and marketing of a quality product, a significant portion of the patent
grant will not be used, and the public will not benefit from the invention
in the unlicensed fields not served by Company A.
Moreover, the right to charge different royalty rates for different
uses of the invention is important because of the different relative values
and sales volumes of the products involved. And if, having licensed the
manufacture and sale of building switches in areas not served by Com-
pany A, it must then license its backyard competitor, a more prudent
course for Company A would have been to refuse to license anyone in
the building field, a decision certainly not in the interests of Company A
or the users of switches outside Los Angeles.
It should not be taken as the author's position that all the patent
license provisions discussed herein should be permitted to stand in all
circumstances. Even the most innocuous or justifiable terms can be
applied in conjunction with other practices to produce results that are
14 Allied Research Products, Inc. v. Heathbath Corp., 161 U.S.P.Q. 527, 530 (N.D. Ill.
1969).
15 Supra note 6.
16 15 U.S.C. § 15 (§ 4 of the Clayton Act).
17 Le Peyre v. Federal Trade Commission, 366 F.2d 115 (5th Cir. 1966) ; Peelers Co.
v. Wendt, 206 F. Supp. 193 (W.D. Wash. 1966); Laitram Corp. v. King Crab, Inc., 245
F. Supp. 1019 (D. Alaska 1965); Antitrust and Trade Regulation Report, No. 411, White
House Task Force Report on Antitrust Policy, Special Supp. pt. I, at 22 (1969).
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anticompetitive and clearly beyond the scope of the patent grant and
inimical to progress in the useful arts. But to adopt the uncertain test
proposed by the Department of Justice, or to permit the declaration of
per se illegality of individual license terms which, in their proper ap-
plication, can bring innovative advances more rapidly into public use
and actually create competition in the process, is to defeat the principal
objectives of both the patent and antitrust laws.
Field-of-Use Licenses
Company B is a large manufacturer of hardgoods of many types
but has limited facilities for chemical research and development, except
with specific reference to adjunctive supplies for its hardgoods. The
company achieves a breakthrough in a chemical process which leads to
the development of a new line of materials for use with its hardgoods.
It also recognizes vast possibilities for the invention in other fields
foreign to its corporate interests and capabilities.
The problem facing Company B is how to make the broadest use
of the process without itself departing significantly from its primary
business. It recognizes that several areas of application are sufficiently
distinct in themselves (paper, pharmaceuticals, novelties, cosmetics)
that no single company could exploit the technology to its fullest. It
therefore chooses to grant exclusive licenses in a number of fields of
use. Several licensees invest considerable sums in adapting the basic
technology to their particular fields and bring the public new products
that differ significantly from the old ones.
Among the ways in which a patent owner can divide his patent-
given rights, two are most important: by geographical territory and
field of use. Although in disfavor with the Department of Justice,"s the
"territorial imperative" is specifically assured in the present statute and
enables the patent owner to license his patent in the whole or any part of
the United States.'" It is, unfortunately, common to refer to this form of
division of the patent right as a territorial "restriction." The technical
objection to the word "restriction" is that it implies an agreement with
respect to the unlicensed territorial scope. However, no such agreement
can properly (or even logically) be implied from the territorial license.
By accepting a territorially-limited license, the licensee is making no
more commitment to stay out of the unlicensed territory than is any other
18 Address by Roland W. Donnem to The Antitrust Section and Patent, Trademark
and Copyright Section of the State Bar of Michigan, Sept. 25, 1969 published in 49 Mich.
BJ. 36 (1970).
19 35 U.S.C. § 261.
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party. If he invades it he is an infringer and, like any other party, is sub-
ject to the consequences thereof.
The license for use or for sale or resale in a specified field of use
might be termed a "functional imperative" and rests on precisely the
same principle as the territorial license. It involves the grant of less than
the patent owner's total right to exclude. As will be noted later, semantics
have also become important here.
There is no assurance that an invention will be neatly proportioned
in its applicable scope to the technical or marketing capabilities or in-
terests of the patent owner, whether the owner be an individual, a small
company or a large company. Company B illustrates a situation where
exclusive field-of-use licenses can be the single, most effective way of
exploiting an invention to the fullest for the benefit of the public as well
as the patent owner. In fact, the situation is a classic example of the op-
eration of the patent incentive to encourage investment in innovation,
for here the parties making the investment (the licensees) are assured of
basic patent protection before they start. They can therefore commit
funds more generously and undertake a more comprehensive program
of development than might otherwise be the case.
Those who oppose licenses to specific fields of use ignore the fact
that such licenses, when translated into marketed products, often provide
the public with alternatives that would not otherwise be available-at
least until the patent has expired. If a patent owner distributes field-of-
use licenses to various producers of different kinds of products, each
licensee, in adapting the invention to his own particular product line,
introduces a new use of the original invention. On the other hand, if the
patent owner limits utilization of the patent only to his line of merchan-
dise, the public may not have the opportunity to enjoy the maximum
potential of the patented invention. While the patent owner must retain
the option to license or not to license, if he chooses to license he should
not be absolutely foreclosed from licensing less than his full patent
right.
The same principle works in the area of copyrights.2" A novel is
usually published first in hard-cover book form. But prior to publication
as a book, it may be serialized in a magazine. The magazine publisher
20 This useful analogy was suggested by Mr. John Schulman in private correspondence.
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receives an exclusive right only for that limited purpose. Thereafter,
the book may be licensed separately for adaptation as a play for the
living stage, or for motion pictures, television or other limited uses, in-
cluding publication of a paperback edition. These licenses of less than
the copyright owner's total right are like the field-of-use license: they
afford the public a variety of options and opportunities to enjoy the work
in different formats.
It was pointed out earlier that the benefit to the patent owner from
a licensing arrangement must be within or ancillary to the scope of the
patent grant. Accordingly, license terms solely for the benefit of the
licensee, such as giving him the right to restrict the patent owner in his
practice of the invention 1 or to veto additional licenses,2 may under-
standably encounter difficulties as outside the grant. But a license is a
two-party negotiated agreement and must offer prospective advantages
for the licensee as well as licensor. Legitimate concerns of a licensee
which the patent owner may properly consider in negotiating terms of
the license include the following, all of which can best be served by a
field-of-use license :23
A prospective licensee may want to commit himself under the
license only for a particular product or technological area in which he
has an interest, but prefer to avoid commitments in speculative areas
where he is unable to make a satisfactory evaluation or has no interest;
The licensee may be able to obtain a lower royalty rate in a field
where the patent owner is not using the patent, because in such fields the
licensee would not be competing with the patent owner;
A licensee may prefer a sliding scale of royalty payments to ease
the expense of his early period of marketing or to reduce the royalty
burden as his volume increases. Where the licensee is practicing under
more than one but not all the fields of the patent's use, the field-of-use
license provides the necessary flexibility in the arrangement;
The licensee may be able to obtain a lower total royalty or lump.
sum requirement for a paid-up license if the license is limited as to
field;
If the license calls for periodic payment of a minimum royalty to
keep the license in force, the licensee may prefer separate licenses for
each field so he can cancel individual licenses where he is unable to
meet the minimum without disturbing the licenses in his more successful
fields; and
21 McCullough v. Kammerer Corp., 166 F.2d 759 (9th Cir. 1948).
22 United States v. Krasnow, 143 F. Supp. 184 (E.D. Pa. 1956).
23 Bowes, Forum Contribution, 12 Idea 1129 (1968-69).
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The licensee may prefer separate field licenses so he may later
assign the licenses with the business of each field, whereas a single
license would be indivisible.
It would seem undeniably within the scope of the patent grant for
Company B, which as the patent owner could rightfully exclude all
others from practicing the invention for any purpose whatsoever, to part
with a portion of its exclusivity corresponding to a given field of use. It
should be readily apparent that the field-of-use provision, like the per.
missible territorial limitation, is really not restrictive. While grant of a
license for a particular field could be coupled with a restriction, the
typical field license standing alone is nothing more than permission to
make, use or sell in a defined segment of technology. It neither expressly
nor impliedly authorizes or denies any right of the licensee with respect
to any other technological area within the patent's scope. The licensee
can operate in other fields of the invention on precisely the same basis
and subject to the same consequences for infringement as anyone else.
Here, as with the territorial license, semantics have become impor-
tant. The Department of Justice sees no difference between a license
containing a positive restriction against selling in a particular field and
a patent license limited to a particular field; by mechanistic reasoning
it would condemn both as illegal divisions of markets.24 It regards the
fact that in most instances the licensee does not stray into the unli-
censed area as evidence of a tacit agreement to divide the market.
Here, it would appear that the Department of Justice is reading the
facts to prove what it wants to prove, in total disregard of business real-
ity: the licensee usually stays within the licensed field because that is
where his interests lie or because he simply doesn't wish to be sued for
infringement. Indeed, the patent owner doesn't need his licensee's agree-
ment not to infringe. The patent itself is sufficient.
There is another paradox in the Department's position. An agree-
ment to divide markets between competitors is a per se violation of
Section I of the Sherman Act. 5 If field-of-use licenses are equated to
division of market agreements, they, too, must be per se antitrust viola-
tions. However, the Department would sanction such licenses where the
patent owner was reserving to himself a portion of the total field covered
24 35 U.S.C. § 261; Address by Special Assistant to the Assistant Attorney General
Bruce B. Wilson to The Patent Law Association of Pittsburgh, Nov. 19, 1969.
25 White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
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by the patent.26 It would seem that if the field-of-use licensee is, accord-
ing to the Department's thesis, impliedly agreeing to stay out of part of
the patent's field in one case, he is doing so in the other. On what basis,
then, can the Department find these field-of-use licenses justifiable and
others not?
It is of interest to note that President Johnson's White House Task
Force on Antitrust Policy,' in a report released and commented on fa-
vorably by Assistant Attorney General McLaren,28 recommended that
patent owners be denied the right to grant exclusive licenses except as to
specific fields of use. (The patent owner would be required to apply to
the Federal Trade Commission for certification that such a license was
necessary to the commercial utilization of the invention.) Thus, the Task
Force recognized the importance of exclusive field-of-use licenses, but
the paradox in the Department of Justice continues.
The courts have been more solicitous. In 1938 the Supreme Court
expressly sanctioned the field-of-use concept in the General Talking Pic-
tures case.29 Since then, licenses to use in a specified field or to sell to
customers for use only in specified fields have been widely upheld."0
Adverse decisions have, of course, resulted where the field-of-use pro-
vision was coupled with practices which in total effect violated antitrust
principles."1
The Department of Justice, however, predicts a judicial turn against
field-of-use licenses. 2 A spokesman argues that the reliance in General
Talking Pictures on the General Electric case,"3 the latter upholding the
right of a patent owner to fix the sales price of its competing licensee-
manufacturer, renders the continued legality of field-of-use licenses "ex-
tremely doubtful" because General Electric is "ripe for overturning."
But price fixing does not form a necessary part of field-of-use licensing.
26 Supra note 6.
27 Antitrust and Trade Regulation Report, No. 411, White House Task Force Report
on Antitrust Policy, Special Supp. pt. I, at 22 (1969).
28 Supra note 6.
29 General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Electric Co., 305 U.S. 124 (1938).
30 The Ansul Co. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 163 U.S.P.Q. 517 (N.D.N.Y. 1969); Nordhaus &
Jurow, Patent-Antitrust Law at 225 (1961, Supp. 1968).
31 Austern, Fish Traps, Indians and Patents: The Antitrust Validity of Patent License
Restrictions on Sales Price, Field of Use, Quantity, and Territory, 28 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 181,
188 (1966) ; Jackson & Jackson, Use Limitations in Patent Licenses, 12 Idea 657 (1968-69).
32 Supra note 18.
38 United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926).
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The Department could be right, however, and if General Electric is over-
turned a court not pausing to examine the different principles involved
might well dispatch the field-of-use license on the unfortunate reasoning
that it is inseparably tied to General Electric. This simply illustrates
the need for legislative clarification of the field-of-use imperative.
The example of Company B shows the type of problem facing the
corporate patent owner. But the situation of the private inventor, research
company or university can readily be envisioned as even more difficult,
for they must often rely exclusively on licensing to bring their inventions
into public use. They must literally sell out to a large company capable
of exploiting all the major fields of use of the invention, or in shaping
a licensing program run the considerable risk of exposing their patents
to the vagaries of court decisions or the pressures of the Department of
Justice.
It will be recalled that President Johnson's Commission on the
Patent System singled out the field-of-use license as a subject of partic-
ular concern. 4 The Commission urged that by statute the owner of a
patent be entitled to license his patent "in the whole or in any specified
part, of the field of use to which the subject matter of the claims of the
patent are directly applicable." It proposed this as an absolute right-
not conditioned by a rule of reason which could be applied mischie-
vously to defeat what the Commission clearly regarded as an imperative
in the effective utilization of patents for the benefit of all concerned.
Senator Scott's amendment to Section 261 of the presently pending
Senate Bill 2756 would implement the Commission's Recommendation
22 in this regard by the following language:
An applicant, patentee, or his legal representative may also, at his
election, waive or grant, by license or otherwise, the whole or any part
of his rights under a patent or patent application and for the whole or
any part of the United States, by exclusive or nonexclusive arrangement
with a party or parties of his selection. (Emphasis added).35
This neatly combines the "territorial" imperative and the "functional"
imperative, together with another absolute imperative, the right to license
or not to license.
84 Report of the President's Commission on the Patent System, U.S. Government
Printing Office (1966).
85 91 Cong. Rec. 5321 (daily ed. April 8, 1970).
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The Right to License or Not to License
Company C owns a patent and manufactures and sells products
covered by its patent. The company is of modest size and through its
relatively small sales organization is unable to reach all the geographical
areas in which its product would find a market. From among its dozen
competitors it selects four whose marketing ability and reach will
supplement its own and give adequate coverage of the neglected areas.
These companies are anxious to add the product to their lines because
they see opportunities, through sales and advertising efforts, for profit-
able expansion. Similarly, Company C, by licensing these four com-
panies, seeks a return by way of royalties from sales it could not make
itself. Although competitors not favored with a license have requested
one, Company C has declined because further licensing would so dilute
the market as to make it unprofitable for any of the licensees as well
as for Company C. The Department of Justice hears from a rejected
competitor and presses Company C to license it. The company complies
but wishes now it had refused to license anyone.
It would seem unnecessary at this stage of our nation's commercial
development to raise the question of the patent owner's right to license
or not to license. However, the Department of Justice has in fact exerted
pressure on patent owners like Company C to grant additional licenses
beyond the first. Moreover, a recommendation of the White House Task
Force on Antitrust Policy would require a patent owner granting one
license under his patent to grant all financially qualified and reputable
applicants a license under terms "neither more restrictive nor less fa-
vorable" than the first license."6
The Task Force engages in an inconsistent dichotomy. It acknowl-
edges that a patent confers on the patentee "the right to exclude others
from the field covered by the patent" and declares allegiance to the
antitrust "goal" of preventing use of a patent beyond its scope. But then
it concludes:
That goal will be served by denying the patentee the right to confine
use of the patent to a preferred group and requiring that if the patent
is licensed it shall be open to competition in its application. (Emphasis
added).
If the patent statute gives the right to exclude, it is clearly within
the scope of the grant to deny licenses altogether or, equally, to deny
additional licenses after the first. But the Task Force would automati-
cally cancel the remaining right of the patent owner not to license solely
86 Antitrust and Trade Regulation Report, No. 411, White House Task Force Report
on Antitrust Policy, Special Supp. pt. H, at 22 (1969).
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for the reason that he did license once before. The Task Force at once
acknowledges the proper limitation of antitrust sanctions to matters
beyond the patent's grant and the determination to penetrate the grant in
the name of antitrust.
Compulsory licensing in the United States has heretofore been re-
served for use by the courts as a penalty for illegal conduct in connection
with patents." Now, however, the Task Force would incorporate the
concept into the law, not as a penalty but to apply uniformly to force
additional licensing by a patent owner who has once licensed his patent.
The fundamental objection to compulsory licensing as law or policy is
fully operative here. To the degree that everyone can have access to a
patent, the incentive otherwise afforded by the patent to invest in its
commercial utilization is dissipated and the purpose of the patent system
subverted.
It is revealing that one dissenting member from the Task Force's
Report was of the opinion that they had "given too little attention to the
patent field" to embark on such recommendations. This, indeed, would
appear to be true.
The problem is not confined to study groups, as is evidenced in a
recent court decision. The patent owner had already licensed his patent
and put his invention into public use, but the court had this to say in
dictum about his refusal to grant the defendant a license:
An owner of a patent cannot assert his rights under the law and
Constitution if such owner refuses to make use of a patent, or to license
a patent so that it may be of use to the public, or refuses to license an
applicant when it has already granted a license to the applicant's
competitor. (Emphasis added).38
It is interesting to compare this language with that of a decision of the
same court (different judge) rendered four months earlier:
Plaintiff has no duty to grant a license to defendant under the patent
in suit, merely because defendant has requested such a license. A patent
owner has the right to grant a license to some, as he chooses, without
granting a license to others. (Emphasis added).39
37 United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 76 (1947); Hartford Empire Co. v.
United States, 323 U.S. 386 (1945).
38 Allied Research Products, Inc., v. Heathbath Corp., 161 U.S.P.Q. 527, 530 (N.D.
Ill. 1969).
39 Bela Seating Co., Inc. v. Poloron Products, Inc., 160 U.S.P.Q. 646 (N.D. IML 1968).
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The selection of licensees is art important undertaking. Activities
reflecting discredit on the invention, such as a poorly conceived sales
approach or inadequate servicing of the product after sale, can in fact
harm the rights remaining with the patent owner. The Task Force would
meet the problem by requiring compulsory licensing only of parties
who are financially responsible and of good reputation. Obviously, this
is not enough. It must remain the right of the patent owner to select his
partners by criteria in addition to solvency and reputation.
When the patent owner negotiates a license, he is committing him-
self for the life of the license, which typically is for the life of the
patent. With the shifting and unpredictable positions of the courts and
the continuing threats from the Department of Justice, it is becoming
increasingly difficult to devise a responsive yet "legal" licensing pro-
gram. Legislative intervention to assure the right to license or not to
license is in order.
It will be noted that Senator Scott's amendment to Section 261 of
Senate Bill 2756, quoted above, would permit the patent owner to license
his patent exclusively or nonexclusively "with a party or parties of his
selection.4" The right to license and, no less, the right not to license are
absolute imperatives that would be appropriately preserved by this
statutory language.
The Freely Negotiated Royalty
Patent owner D licensed sixteen companies who were eager to
practice the technology of the patent. Royalty and other terms were
essentially the same for each licensee, following hard negotiations for
the first license. One company declined to accept a license because it
regarded the royalty as too high. Several years later it began producing
and selling the patented product, and D promptly sued for infringement.
The infringer's defense was that D should not be permitted to enforce
his patent because the royalty it charged licensees was so exorbitant
and oppressive as to violate the antitrust laws. The court agreed, and an
extensive and successful licensing program was placed in jeopardy.
The above situation is taken from real life. The Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit held in 1966 that a royalty found to be "ex-
orbitant and oppressive" could be a per se violation of the antitrust
laws on the theory that prices could effectively be fixed by requir-
40 91 Cong. Rec. 5321 (daily ed. April 8, 1970).
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ing such a royalty.41 On remand for determination of whether the
royalty was in fact "exorbitant and oppressive," the district court con-
cluded it was not.42 But the proposition stands as precedent, at least in
the Seventh Circuit. One is moved to wonder if an initially "reasonable"
royalty could become "exorbitant and oppressive" by virtue of changing
competitive conditions in the industry, making the continuation of the
license or its enforcement by the patent owner a per se violation of the
antitrust laws. The uncertainty is unsettling.
Prior to the foregoing decision, the Supreme Court had spoken
unequivocally on the right of the patent owner to negotiate any royalty
acceptable to a licensee. In 1926 the Court said:
Conveying less than title to the patent or part of it, the patentee may
grant a license to make, use and vend articles under the specifications
of his patent for any royalty. .... 4.
Again, in 1964 the Supreme Court reaffirmed this position:
A patent empowers the owner to exact royalties as high as he can
negotiate with the leverage of the patent monopoly.44
A well-reasoned decision in the Ninth Circuit in 1957 reached the same
conclusion, stoutly defending the right of a patent owner to set his roy-
alty (while holding against him for patent misuse on other grounds):
To say that the mere amount of money due and payable for the grant
of a license is subject to judicial review would render each and every
agreement made subject to court approval. 45
Where royalty is excessive the problem is usually self-adjusting.
It means simply that the parties did not comprehend the nature of the
market or they underestimated the competition. Once the agreement is
signed, both parties want the product sold. If excessive royalty forces
the selling price to uncompetitive levels, it would be a rare and short-
sighted patent owner who would not be willing to reduce the royalty in
exchange for larger sales volume and, ultimately, greater royalty in-
come.
41 American Photocopy Equipment Co. v. Rovico, Inc., 148 U.S.P.Q. 631 (7th Cir.
1966).
42 American Photocopy Equipment Co. v. Rovico, Inc., 257 F. Supp. 192 (N.D. Ill.
1966), aft'd, 384 F.2d 813 (7th Cir. 1967).
43 United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476, 489 (1926).
44 Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 143 U.S.P.Q. 264, 266 (1964).
45 Steams v. Tinker and Rasor, 116 U.S.P.Q. 222, 235 (9th Cir. 1957).
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A royalty freely agreed to by the parties in what they initially
conceive to be their mutual interests should be left to the parties for
further negotiation if their mutual interests are no longer being served.
The threat of judicial reformation of royalty provisions or, worse, of
judicial determination that a royalty established by mutual agreement
is an antitrust violation should be laid to rest by statute. Senator Scott's
proposed amendment to Section 271 would sanction "a royalty, fee or
purchase price.., in any amount."46
Royalty Differential Between Nonexclusive Licensees
University E owns a patent on a chemical having unique properties
of interest for diverse uses. University E has no manufacturing facil-
ities and no means for developing the uses commercially. It therefore
licenses two manufacturers. One will invest in development of a valuable
new use involving low volume consumption of the compound. The
other will undertake to develop a new process utilizing the patented
compound to manufacture more cheaply a known chemical for which
the volume demand is high but market price relatively low. Royalty
is set in each license to reflect the individual combinations of low
volume-high value and high volume-low value, both in keeping with
competition in the fields involved, the development costs to be incurred
and, inherently, the value of the patented compound in the licensees'
undertakings.
As in the above situation and the earlier examples of Company A
and Company B, business realities often demand different royalty rates
among licensees under the same patent.
Despite many court decisions clearly holding the patent owner
entitled to any royalty or financial arrangement he can negotiate (on
the theory that he does not have to license anyone), where two or more
licensees paying different royalties under the same patent enter the
picture the patent owner's position is less certain. A judicial trend may
or may not be indicated in the most recent decisions close to the point,
but varying leasing rates for the same patented machines have been
held to violate Section 2 of the Sherman Act, Section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act and to be a patent misuse.' In those cases differ-
ent rentals (royalties) were held to be anti-competitive in effect, even
though allegedly based on the proportion of labor saved by use of the
patented machines.
46 91 Cong. Rec. 5321 (daily ed. April 8, 1970).
47 Le Peyre v. Federal Trade Commission, 366 F.2d 117 (5th Cir. 1966); Peelers Co.
v. Wendt, 206 F. Supp. 193 (W.D. Wash. 1966); Laitram Corp. v. King Crab, Inc., 24$
F. Supp. 1019 (D. Alaska 1965).
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Moreover, a principal recommendation of President Johnson's
White House Task Force on Antitrust Policy would require all sub-
sequent licenses to be on terms "neither more restrictive nor less favor-
able" than the first license.4" Mr. McLaren has alluded to this
recommendation in public addresses but says he is "not at this time"
taking a position of approval or disapproval.49 A more recent statement
by a Department of Justice representative, however, approves different
royalty rates for different uses if the patent owner freely licenses all
uses.
50
Despite the compelling business justifications for such arrange-
ments, patent owners are understandably concerned over the uncertainty
of differential royalties. This, too, needs legislative clarification. Sen-
ator Scott's amendment to Section 271 would permit "a royalty, fee or
purchase price ... differing from that provided in some other arrange-
ment."'
The Royalty Base
Oil well drilling Company F licenses a patent on a method for
treating the formation to increase oil production. The method involves
use of chemicals already employed in the drilling process for other
purposes. It is not feasible for the company to install special equipment
to monitor use of the old chemicals for the new purpose. The parties
agree that royalty will be determined on the basis of average improve-
ment in oil production each month over a predetermined level.
Ideally, royalty under a product patent is based on the number of
patented products produced or sold. But frequently the patent covers a
process or a part of a machine or composition instead of the final
product. In such event the royalty to which the patent owner is entitled
may be based on some unpatented, measurable parameter.
In complex situations, however, such as that facing Company F, a
less responsive or even nonresponsive basis is appropriate. For exam-
ple, in the manufacture of television and radio sets involving many pat-
ents, royalty based on total sales has been upheld.52 The rationale
48 Antitrust and Trade Regulation Report No. 411, White House Task Force Report
on Antitrust Policy, Special Supp. pt. I, at 22 (1969).
49 Supra note 6.
50 Address by Special Assistant to the Assistant Attorney General Bruce B. Wilson to
the Patent Law Association of Pittsburgh, Nov. 19, 1969.
51 91 Cong. Rec. 5321 (daily ed. April 8, 1970).
52 Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 161 U.S.P.Q. 577
(1969).
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advanced by the Supreme Court is the convenience of the parties and
the absence of coercion by the patent owner. Other decisions involving
payment of royalty regardless of whether all of a large number of
patents are used rest on the premise that the licensee is paying for the
privilege to use them.53
While decisions raising the issue have usually been reasonable on
their facts, litigation on the point has in every case put the defending
party to great pains and expense. A simple legislative affirmance of the
right to base royalty, fee or purchase price for a patented invention on
any mutually agreeable parameter, absent coercion by the patent owner,
that reasonably reflects the use of the invention would alleviate one
troublesome aspect of patent litigation. Senator Scott's amendment to
Section 271 would allow royalty to be based on any method or measure-
ment of payment, whether or not related to the subject matter of the
patent or the extent of its use. 4
Royalty for the Package License
Municipality G operates a sewage treatment plant. Different
conditions of temperature, solids content and other properties of the
sewage require different treatments to achieve separation of the solids.
The municipality takes a license under a group of patents which to-
gether offer advantages in treating the municipality's sewage under most
of the conditions encountered. Some conditions require practice of
one combination of patents, other conditions require another combina-
tion. Since all the patents relate to a single ultimate purpose, namely, the
treatment of sewage, and since it was not possible to separate the patents
as to importance, the license agreement calls for payment of royalties
until expiration of the last-to-expire of the licensed patents.
There are two central aspects to the licensing of a group or package
of patents of special interest here. The first is the legality of the package
license; the second is the validity of an agreement that states a single
royalty for use of any one or more of the licensed patents, such roy-
alty to continue so long as any of the licensed patents are alive.
The owner of a valuable patent is theoretically in a position to
coerce a potential licensee into accepting a license under other patents
of lesser or no value. It has been held that a party who seeks or volun-
53 Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827 (1950); The
Ansul Co. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 163 U.S.P.Q. 517 (N.D.N.Y.); Nordhaus & Jurow, Patent-
Antitrust Law at 225 (1961, Supp. 1968).
54 91 Cong. Rec. 5321 (daily ed. April 8, 1970).
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tarily accepts a package license does not thereby impose antitrust or
patent misuse liability on the patent owner.55 But where the patent
owner insists that the license include more patents than the licensee
wants, and the patents cover more than a single product, the courts
have held the package to constitute an illegal tying arrangement.56
Where a single product is involved, a mandatory package may be per-
missible,57 although ultimately this question will depend on whether
tying arrangements are held to be per se violations of the antitrust laws
or subject to a rule of reason.5" Fairly clear and objective criteria have
thus been spelled out for determining the legality of a package license.
But the second aspect of package licensing is more troublesome.
Given the judicial approval of voluntary package licensing and the
business realities leading to the practice, it would follow that a royalty
established during negotiations contemplates the value of the total pack-
age and carries no implication of the value of the individual patents.
In fact, particularly in a situation like that of Municipality G exempli-
fied above, it is manifestly impossible to assign such values. Moreover,
in many cases the patents cover alternate ways of doing the same thing,
or features that are mutually exclusive and cannot be used together in
a single product.
The problem of royalties does not become acute until some of the
patents in the package begin to expire. At that time, assuming the li-
censee is still practicing under one or more of the patents in the original
package, should the royalty be reduced as each patent expires? If so,
by how much? If not, is the licensor guilty of extending the monopoly
of the expired patents?
The division of the inventions between the various licensed patents,
where all are related to the same product or product line or process, is
often for the administrative convenience of the Patent Office. And the
initial royalty and license are based on the totality of the subject mat-
ter to which the licensee desires access. It would therefore seem reason-
able in such instances to permit royalty payments to continue so long
55 Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 161 U.S.P.Q. 577
(1969); Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827 (1950).
56 American Security Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 268 F.2d 769 (3d Cir. 1959),
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 902.
57 International Mfg. Co. v. Landon, Inc., 336 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1964).
58 Northern Pacific Railroad Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
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as any patent in the original package that is being used remains unex-
pired.
The courts are in conflict. In the Tenth Circuit the practice of per-
mitting royalties to continue has been approved, 9 as it was earlier by
the Supreme Court."0 But in the Third and Sixth Circuits the same prac-
tice has been held a patent misuse.6
The pragmatic effect of the diversity of opinions in the courts
leaves the patent owner defenseless against the prospective licensee who
negotiates a royalty for a group of patents when he really wants access
to only one. After negotiating for the package, he then asks for a li-
cense under a single patent and insists on a pro rata reduction in
royalty under pain of a charge of misuse or illegal tying.
If the parties are unable or disinclined to agree to a royalty break-
down at the inception of the license, absent a package based on coer-
cion, and if at least one significant patent is still alive and being prac-
ticed, the full royalty should continue as agreed upon. Needless and
expensive litigation could be avoided by statutory acknowledgement of
this practical resolution of the problem. Senator Scott's amendment to
Section 271 would not require royalty to be separately stated for any
single patent in a licensed package. 2
Royalty Payment After Expiration of Patent
Patent owner H licenses a small, capable company under an impor-
tant patent. It was anticipated at the negotiations that fairly substantial
sums would have to be invested by the licensee to develop the product
for market. Accordingly, no initial payment was required by H, but
royalties were set at a compensating level. The product was duly de-
veloped and marketed, with success. However, unforeseen events caused
a financial crisis in the company, and it was unable to maintain its
royalty commitments. H agreed to accept payment of back royalties
over a period of years, which extended beyond expiration of the patent.
All royalties were based solely on activities under the patent before it
expired.
59 Well Surveys, Inc. v. Perfo-Log, Inc., 396 F.2d 15 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 951; McCullough Tool Co. v. Well Surveys, Inc., 343 F.2d 381 (10th Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 383 U.S. 933 (1965).
60 Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827 (1950).
01 Rocform Corp. v. Acitelli-Standard Concrete Wall, Inc. 367 F.2d 678 (6th Cir.
1966) ; American Security Co. v. Shatterproof Class Corp., 268 F.2d 769 (3d Cir. 1959),
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 902.
62 91 Cong. Rec. 5321 (daily ed. April 8, 1970).
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The 1964 decision by the Supreme Court in Brulotte v. Thys Co."3
held that a license requiring payment of royalties after expiration of
the last-to-expire of a group of licensed patents was an attempt at pro-
jecting the patent monopoly and hence a misuse. Uneasiness with the
arrangement exemplified above stems from the allegation in Brulotte
that payments were simply being spread over an extended period. The
Court, however, found "intrinsic evidence" that post-expiration pay-
ments were for post-expiration activities. There can be little dispute
that the Court reached the proper conclusion on its interpretation of the
facts.
A patent owner should be free to negotiate the best royalty terms
he can get, so long as the royalties are tied to activities taking place
during the life of the patent. If the licensee under the patent is unable
to carry the royalty burden, payments based on use of the patent during
its life should be permitted to extend over whatever period the parties
agree is tolerable, even though the payments continue after the patent
expires.
While the Supreme Court did not expressly rule out installment
payment of royalties, the decision has raised the prospect that payment
of royalties beyond the patent's expiration might be held to be a misuse.
Whether through inadvertence or by design, the Court has left doubt in
the minds of many as to the legality of post-expiration installment pay-
ments. This question could be settled by legislative approval of post-
expiration payment of royalties accrued during the life of the licensed
patents. Senator Scott's amendment to Section 271 would require all
payments under a license, whenever due, to be for activities prior to
expiration of the patent.
6 4
PATENTS AS PROPERTY
The present statute declares that "patents shall have the attri-
butes of personal property." 5 As will be shown, much of the agitation
from antitrust theorists today is in derogation of this concept.
There is no dispute that a principal attribute of personal property
is the owner's right of use and disposition. Of course, the law will im.
63 379 U.S. 29 (1964).
64 91 Cong. Rec. 5321 (daily ed. April 8, 1970).
65 35 U.S.C. 261 (1954).
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pose limitations on the right or apply sanctions against the owner where
the public is injured by the exercise of the right. But ownership acts of
use and disposition which are themselves legal will not be interdicted
merely because they may lead to illegal or undesirable consequences.
The owner of private property enjoys, in effect, a presumption that his
acts in exercising his ownership rights of use and disposition are legal.
He does not have to demonstrate their legality or test them by a rule of
reason. The burden of establishing that his conduct is illegal or against
the public interest is on the party asserting it. Indeed, our society could
function in no other way.
Patents are a species of personal property. An important attribute
of patent property should therefore be the patent owner's right to the
benefits of use and disposition. Certainly, a normal incident of patent
ownership should be the right of the patent owner to retain the entire
patent property for his own use, or to dispose of all or part of it when-
ever, wherever and to whomever he chooses. It should not be presumed
at the outset that, in exercising his right of disposition, the patent owner
is going to misuse it. Or, simply because he might misuse it, he should
not be automatically foreclosed from disposing of his patent on terms
that are in themselves perfectly legal.
Nevertheless, the Department of Justice and some judicial deci-
sions would deny the owner of patent property the same benefits and
presumptions accorded owners of other forms of personal property. To
implement its bias, the Department avails itself of a ready access to the
courts (through bringing suits or filing amicus briefs) in cases it
selects as most potentially destructive on their facts to the licensing
practices it wishes to outlaw. In addition, the Department is utilizing
other forms of attack, such as direct pressure, public announcements by
Department representatives on the banquet circuit, threats of suits and
consent decrees to force its views on patent owners who do not wish or
cannot afford to serve as test cases for new antitrust theories.
Some have urged, in the presumed spirit of compromise, that a
rule of reason be imported into the patent statute to test license provi.
sions against antitrust proscriptions. While the rule is often benevolently
employed as though it were a "rule of presumptive reasonableness," it
is also susceptible of application in a manner requiring, in present con-
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text, a patent owner to prove the reasonableness of his licensing ar-
rangement, even though he is disposing of his patent rights on terms
that are prima facie legal. It is no answer to say that license provisions
should not be upheld unless they are "reasonable" from the antitrust
standpoint, for the substantive importance of the burden of proof in
any such determination is well recognized. Thus, it is submitted, where
reasonableness is the only acceptable alternative to per se illegality of
a licensing arrangement, it should be expressed as a "rule of presump-
tive reasonableness" and the burden unmistakably placed on the party
asserting unreasonableness.
Senator Scott's amendments include a test of reasonableness only
in conjunction with a paragraph permitting inclusion of license pro-
visions that are "reasonable under the circumstances to secure to the
patent owner the full benefit of his invention and patent grant." 66
According to the Senator's introductory remarks, this is meant to in-
clude such matters as royalty reports to the licensor and other pro-
visions for implementing terms of the license.
SUMMARY
It is too little appreciated that the role of patents in securing or sup-
plementing the ability to market an invention can be as important as
the role of patents in providing an incentive to invent or to invest in in-
ventive efforts. Whether patents benefit the public and the patent owner
or become vestigial depends in large measure on what patent owners
are entitled to do with them.
This article does not contend for the legitimation by statute of
practices heretofore generally condemned under antitrust. It does, how-
ever, urge resistance to the progressive encroachment of antitrust on
practices clearly within the patent grant.
Three absolute imperatives for a vital patent system are under seri-
ous attack. The territorial imperative, part of the present statute, ena-
bles the patent owner to license his patent in any specified part of the
United States. The functional imperative, sanctioned for many years
in court decisions, entitles the patent owner to license any part of the
field of use of his invention. (Both proceed on the sound theory that a
66 91 Cong. Rec. 5321 (daily ed. April 8, 1970).
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patent owner who can retain all patent rights for himself should be per-
mitted to license less than all those rights to other parties.) The impera-
tive of selection, presumed until recently to be the law everywhere,
accords a patent owner the right to select or reject parties as licensees,
regardless of whether he has previously licensed the patent. It is sub-
mitted that these licensing practices should be per se legal by statute.
Five provisional imperatives are likewise in danger. These at the
very least need protection against the declaration or constant urging of
per se illegality when in fact they may be entirely reasonable under the
circumstances. Thus, the patent owner should have available to him, so
he can adapt the license to the business situation he faces, the right to
establish any royalty by free negotiation, to set different royalties be-
tween different nonexclusive licensees, to base royalties on any con-
venient parameter, to decline to break out royalty for single patents in
a package license voluntarily agreed to by the licensee and to collect
royalty after expiration of a patent for activities prior thereto. Such
provisions should, by statute, at least carry a presumption of reason-
ableness so that the burden of proving unreasonableness would rest on
the party asserting it.
Patents and matters involving patents have no constant advocate
as does antitrust. The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice
is heard in the courts, where it initiates litigation or submits briefs,
and in business, to which it announces areas of patent licensing that will
be the subject of future challenge.
In the absence of a counter-force on behalf of the patent system,
the recourse of those determined to preserve the patent incentive in its
total concept, so inextricably bound to the right to license, is to seek
legislation upholding the practices that need support against the un-
bridled club and clout of antitrust.
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